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INTRODUCTION: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
THAT AMENDMENT "CENTRAL TO
ENJOYMENT OF OTHER GUARANTEES
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS"*
Yale Kamisar**
Seventy years ago, in the famous Weeks case,' the Supreme Court
evoked a storm of controversy by promulgating the federal exclusionary
rule. When, a half-century later, in the landmark Mapp case,2 the Court
extended the Weeks rule to state criminal proceedings, at least one ex-
perienced observer assumed that the controversy "today finds its end." 3
But as we all know now, Mapp only intensified the controversy. In-
deed, in recent years spirited debates over proposals to modify the ex-
clusionary rule or to scrap it entirely have filled the air - and the
law reviews.'
In the hue and cry over the exclusionary rule, however, not a few
may have overlooked that, as Justice Potter Stewart pointed out shortly
after stepping down from the Supreme Court, limiting or reducing the
situations in which exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
is required is only one way to reduce the impact of the exclusionary
rule. The other way to do so - and in a sense the focus of this sym-
posium - is by relaxing the requirements of the fourth amendment
* Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 163 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Murphy and
Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). Continued Justice Frankfurter: "How can there be freedom of thought
or freedom of speech or freedom of religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your
home and mine from garret to cellar merely because they are executing a warrant of arrest?
How can men feel free if all their papers may be searched, as an incident to the arrest of someone
in the house, on the chance that something may turn up, or rather, be turned up?" Id. See
also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 377-78 (1974).
** Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., 1950, New York Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1954, Columbia University; LL.D., 1978, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
(CUNY).
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring).
4. Compare, e.g., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 8 (1978); Carrington, Good Faith
Mistakes and the Exclusionary Rule, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 35 (Summer/Fall 1982); Jensen &
Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
916 (1982); and Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
214 (1978) with, e.g., Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); LaFave,
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith, "
43 U. PITr. L. REV. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception
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itself or by shrinking its scope.'
In the first article in the symposium, 6 Professor Wayne R. LaFave
addresses a number of issues that, as he says, have "a critical bearing
upon the effectiveness of our law enforcement processes and the ex-
tent of our protected liberty and privacy": 7 What police-citizen con-
tacts constitute "seizures" of a person within the meaning of the fourth
amendment? What is the quantum of evidence needed to justify a par-
ticular "seizure"? And what "seizures" may be made without a war-
rant? This article shows LaFave at his best (which is the way he almost
always is). Need one say more?
Although Professor LaFave is too modest to say so, the view, first
advanced by Justice Stewart in 1980 and now supported by a majority
of the Court, that certain police-citizen "encounters" or "confronta-
tions" (such as a drug agent approaching a person at the airport, iden-
tifying himself, and asking to see the traveller's driver's license and
airline ticket) should not be regarded as "seizures" at all for fourth
amendment purposes,' is essentially the approach suggested by LaFave
himself in his 1978 treatise.9 Indeed, at least one commentator has called
to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (196 1);
and Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 28 (Sum-
mer/Fall 1982).
There is a considerable literature - and considerable disagreement among empiricists - regarding
the "costs" and "benefits" of the exclusionary rule and the significance of the available data.
Compare, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970) and Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that It Is a Deterrent
to Police? 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) with, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
220-54 (1977) and Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979). For a recent comprehensive and, in my judgment, outstand-
ing article on the general subject, see Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need
to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of
"Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611.
After the articles making up this symposium were written, a 6-3 majority of the Court, per
White, J., adopted a so called "good faith" exception - actually a "reasonable mistake" excep-
tion - to the exclusionary rule, at least in search warrant cases. United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 1 would like to think, but I find it very hard to believe, that the new excep-
tion will be confined to the warrant setting. Running through Justice White's opinion for the
Court in Leon is a strong skepticism that the "extreme sanction of exclusion," as the Court
twice called it, id. at 3418, 3423, can "pay its way" as an effective deterrent unless the under-
lying fourth amendment violations are deliberate or at least substantial. See also Justice White's
dissenting opinion in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3493, 3495 (1984) (decided the
same day as Leon) (indicating that Leon stands for the general proposition that unless the evidence
was obtained by "deliberate violations" of the fourth amendment or by conduct "a reasonably
competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution" the exclusionary rule should not
be applied).
5. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1397 .(1983).
6. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant,
Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417 (1984).
7. Id. at 419.
8. See id. at 420-26.
9. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(g),
[VOL. 17:3
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it "the LaFave-Stewart approach.""0
I take nothing away from the other able contributors to this sym-
posium when I say that it seems only fitting and proper that the leadoff
article should belong to LaFave. The search and seizure literature is
quite rich, but there cannot be any doubt that LaFave has written more
outstanding articles on the subject than anyone else. And, although
published only six years ago, his monumental treatise on the fourth
amendment" has already become, and deservedly so, one of the most
frequently quoted and cited works of all time.
The second contributor to the symposium, Professor Joseph D.
Grano, is a commentator who is hard to classify (which is the way
he likes it). Two years ago, for example, Grano sharply criticized the
Court for failing to give appropriate respect to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement and made a powerful argument that only a re-
examination of basic premises could bring harmony and coherence to
search warrant law.' 2 In his current article,' 3 however, he presents a
strong defense of the much-criticized Gates case. 4
Gates at least partially dismantled the prevailing analytical structure
for determining probable cause - the so-called "two-pronged test." 5
According to this test, an informer's tip, standing alone, furnishes prob-
able cause for issuance of a warrant only when an officer states fhe
reasons that led him to conclude that the informant (a) was generally
trustworthy (the "veracity" prong) and (b) had obtained his informa-
tion in a reliable way (the "basis of knowledge" prong).
As for the view of Gates's critics that the two-pronged test pro-
vided a useful structure within which police and magistrates alike could
meaningfully operate and that a "common-sense decision" on prob-
able cause necessitates attention to both "prongs" - "to treat a strong
showing of one as curing a deficiency in the other makes a mockery
of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement"' 6 - Grano
at 53-55 (1978).
10. Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-80 141 (1981).
11. W. LAFAVE, supra note 9. By the time this symposium appears in print LaFave will have
co-authored another three-volume treatise: W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1984).
12. See Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 603 (1982). See also his strong criticism of the Court in Grano, Foreword: Perplexing Ques-
tions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause,
and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425 (1978).
13. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465 (1984).
14. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
15. Because Gates involved the validity of a search warrant and the opinion contains some
langugage indicating that the decision is, or should be, limited to such cases, a plausible argu-
ment can be made that Gates is, or will be, confined to the search warrant context. But as I
have indicated elsewhere, I very much doubt that the case is, or will be, so limited. See Kamisar,
Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 581-84 (1984).
16. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 138 (Supp. 1984). To the same effect is LaFave, Fourth
Introduction
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responds: "[1]t is [the two-pronged test's] rigidity, not Gates's flex-
ibility, that defies common sense and thereby 'makes a mockery of
[the] probable cause requirement.' "17 As for the view of Gates's critics
that the case unduly softens the probable cause standard, Grano
responds, persuasively and at considerable length, that both the English
common law and the early American views were that probable cause
required only "reasonable suspicion" or "a focused suspicion"' 8 and
the historical view of probable cause as a relatively undemanding con-
cept "comports with sound policy and common sense."' 9
Having joined in the criticism of Gates," I started reading Grano's
article without much enthusiasm. But as I read along I did so with
growing, albeit begrudging, admiration. Grano makes a better case for
the results reached in Gates than I thought possible - certainly a better
one, if I may say so, than the Court itself did. And the arguments
of Gates's critics are fairly stated and fully explored. One may, of
course, dispute Grano's conclusions, but even those who do so should
recognize that his article is a notable achievement. "All voices are heard,
and we are told why Reason chooses to follow one set of arguments
rather than another." 2'
At several points along the way, Professor Grano strikes at the king
himself, Wayne LaFave, and I have to say that he lands some solid
blows. A decade and a half ago, Grano earned his LL.M. under the
direct supervision of LaFave and, although one would gain little in-
kling of it from his current article, Grano is a good friend and ad-
mirer of his former mentor. But when Grano does battle in the law
reviews he has no friends or idols. This is the way it should be -
and the only way LaFave would want it.
Professor John M. Burkoff, an unabashed critic of the "Burger
Court," ' 2 is the third contributor to the symposium. In his article on
Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and
Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1194 (1983), an article that grew out
of various parts of the 1984 Supplement to the LaFave Treatise but was published after Pro-
fessor Grano's article went to press.
17. Grano, supra note 13, at 519.
18. See id. at 479-91.
19. Id. at 469.
20. See Kamisar, supra note 15; LaFave, supra note 16, at 1186-99; Loewy, Protecting Citizens
from Cops and Crooks; An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. REV. 329, 336-45 (1984) (criticizing the Court's
handling of "probable cause," but not its abandonment of the "two-pronged test"); Wasserstrom,
The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRnI. L. REV. 257, 274-75, 329- 40 (1984)
(same); cf. Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Did and Did Not Do, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 93
(1984) (criticizing the Court's "rhetoric" but maintaining that, on its facts, Gates is an exceedingly
narrow holding).
21. Cf. Paulsen, Criminal Law Administration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CALIF. L.
REF. 103, 107 (1965) (praising Judge Roger Traynor's opinion in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), adopting the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law).
22. See especially Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph
[VOL. 17:3
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"pretext searches" and "pretext arrests" 23 (e.g., a traffic arrest as a
pretext to conduct a search for drugs), Professor Burkoff demonstrates
why he is widely regarded as one of the scrappiest and most forceful
search and seizure commentators around. He must realize (and he is
not alone) that he is swimming against an increasingly strong current,
but undaunted he carries on.
As Burkoff notes "the Court has made it increasingly difficult to
establish [pretext searches]"; indeed one recent decision appears to man-
date "objective" fourth amendment analysis, "declaring irrelevant to
such inquiry the subjective intent of searching police officers." 2 ' As
Burkoff forcefully argues however, "objective" analysis is not enough:
Not only is fourth amendment doctrine threatened, the whole
fabric of the law is threatened, when the law permits - even
encourages - the State to legitimize its otherwise unconstitu-
tional acquisition of evidence on the basis of a lie. That is why
a defendant must also be offered the opportunity to demonstrate
pretext subjectively, where the objective evidence is otherwise
unilluminating.25
In recent years, the "deterrence" rationale of the exclusionary rule
and its concomitant "interest-balancing" have come to center stage. 6
But the "deterrence" rationale seems to be a one-way street - a basis
for narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule but never, apparent-
ly, for expanding it.27 "[Alt a time when the exclusionary rule is regularly
of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979).
23. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 523 (1984).
24. Id. at 523-24.
25. Id. at 549.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974). See generally Kamisar, supra note 4, at 627-67; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4,
at 375-89; Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1975);
Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement,
59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
27. Consider, for example, the doctrine that a defendant lacks "standing" to object to evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. The original basis for this doctrine
seems to be either the joint foundation of the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause
or the notion that the exclusionary rule provides a remedy for a wrong done to the defendant
- thus, if a defendant has not been wronged he is entitled to no remedy. See Kamisar, supra
note 4, at 634 and the authorities referred to therein. The "standing" requirement seems incon-
sistent with the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule. See id. at 634- 35. Nevertheless, despite
the ascendancy of the deterrence rationale, we have witnessed a significant "stiffening" of the
"standing" limitation in recent years. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Consider, too, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984), holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings. This conclusion was reached despite the
government's concession that INS agents conduct searches for and seizures of illegal aliens in
Introduction
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limited in application by a majority of the Supreme Court to those
situations where deterrence is seen as incrementally maximized, what
more optimal setting for its application," asks Burkoff, "than one
where a searching officer's clear and confessed 'bad faith' is established
on the record?" 2 Yet "the Supreme Court can be seen as intimating...
that fourth amendment restraints upon law enforcement officers' ex-
ercise of discretionary authority to search for (or seize) evidence are
nonexistent as long as a lawful-sounding 'cover story' for a given search
or arrest can be concocted . '.'.."29
In the final article in the symposium, 3° Professor William J. Mertens
underscores, and explores, the two basic functions of the fourth amend-
ment: "interest balancing" (the amendment requires a sufficiently
weighty public interest before the police may be permitted to conduct
a search or seizure) and "discretion control" (even when the govern-
mental interest is sufficiently strong that it might otherwise justify a
search or seizure, the governmental intrusion may still be illegal if allow-
ing it would confer too great a discretionary authority on the police).
Co-author of one of the most exhaustively researched, most insightful,
and most powerfully written search and seizure articles of our time,3
Professor Mertens' first solo performance in the search and seizure
field is a highly impressive one. Indeed, it seems a remarkable feat
for one who has only been in law teaching two years, but it becomes
more understandable when one learns that Mertens spent six eventful
years in the District of Columbia public defender's office before entering
academe.
Among other things, Professor Mertens very ably discusses the cur-
rent expansion of Terry v. Ohio32 (and its companion "stop-and-frisk"
cases)33 well beyond their facts - an expansion that "threatens to hand
the police new search and seizure powers with little protection against
discretionary abuse." 3 And his long, hard look back at the 1968 "stop-
order to bring about their deportation and despite the Court's acknowledgment that "the arresting
officer's primary objective, in practice, will be to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding"
and that "the agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same officials who subse-
quently bring the deportation action." ld. at 3486. Dissenting Justice White argued quite per-
suasively, however, that because "the conduct challenged here falls within the 'offending of-
ficer's zone of primary interest' " and "because civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents
what criminal trials are to police officers," there exists "no principled basis for distinguishing
between the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule in criminal cases and in civil deportation
proceedings." Id. at 3492.
28. Burkoff, supra note 23, at 550.
29. Id. at 524.
30. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 551 (1984).
31. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4.
32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
34. Mertens, supra note 30, at 617. For another very able discussion of what he calls "the
Terry-expansion cases," see Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 355-74.
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and-frisk cases themselves is outstanding. Indeed, I would rank it as
one of the two best discussions of these troublesome decisions ever
to appear in the literature."
In a recent short essay on the Warren and Burger Courts and police
practices, I went so far as to say that if resolution of the stop-and-
frisk cases had been delayed a few years longer, and if the Burger Court,
say in 1971, rather than the Warren Court in 1968, had written the
same opinions as those actually written by Chief Justice Warren, "the
decisions would have been deemed solid evidence of the changing
philosophy of the 'emerging Nixon majority,' " and the opinions of
the Court "would have been denounced by admirers of the Warren
Court for "leav[ing] the lower courts without guidance' " and for
i'gross negligence concerning the state of the record and the control-
ling precedents.' "36 In the course of his masterly dissection of the "stop-
and-frisk" cases I think Mertens, in effect, spells out, better than I
could, why this is so.
There is much meat in this symposium for students of constitutional-
criminal procedure. But generalists need not, and should not, turn away.
The articles that follow are valuable not only because the subject mat-
ter is so significant and the authors so knowledgeable about their chosen
topics, but because each provides important insights about the Court
as an institution. The non-criminal procedure specialist will not find
these insights hard to absorb, I am confident, because each contributor
to the symposium writes (and reads) easily, writes clearly, and writes
with power and style.
A final word. A decade-ago, a young ex-Supreme Court clerk sug-
gested that criminal procedure may be "the part of the Court's work
most susceptible to swings of the pendulum after a change of
personnel." 37 At the time he said that, a time when the Court seemed
to be stalking the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and laying the
groundwork to overrule Miranda,3" I agreed emphatically with him.
In succeeding years, however, I began to entertain serious doubts. The
fears (or hopes) that the Warren Court's work in criminal procedure
would be dismantled did not materialize - indeed the new Court's
hostility to its predecessor's police rulings subsided appreciably - or
so it seemed to me.39
The past two Terms, however, have produced mounting evidence
35. As every fourth amendment buff knows, the classic discussion of the subject is LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV.
39 (1968), reprinted in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW 135 (F. Allen ed. 1982).
36. Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is
It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62, 65 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
37. J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW 146 (1974).
38. See Kamisar, supra note 36, at 68.
39. See id. at 68, 78-81, 86-91; See also Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and
Introduction
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that, after the passage of a number of years in which prosecuting at-
torneys have enjoyed mixed success, the so-called Burger Court has
hit its stride and may yet dramatically illustrate that ex-law clerk's point.
(Not a few would maintain that it has already done so.) How pro-
nounced the swing of the pendulum will ultimately turn out to be -
especially in the search and seizure area, where most of the action has
occurred and continues to take place - is still anybody's "educated
guess." But Court watchers of all stripes will be able to make a much
more informed guess, I submit, if they peruse the articles in this
symposium.
the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1977), reprinted in POLICE PRACTICES
AND THE LAW 69 (F. Allen ed. 1982); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980). But see Arenella,
Foreword: Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983). See also the comments of Paul Bender and David
Rudovsky in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS (Dorsen ed. 1984), at 203-18, 243-46.
[VoL. 17:3
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